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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
CATHRYN PFANNENSTIEL, 
Appellant. 
) 
11313 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appeallant appeals from a denial of a Motion to 
Quash the Information by the Honorable Charles G. 
Cowley and Appellant's subsequent conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
The appellant was charged with and convicted of 
issuing a check against insufficient funds in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967). Prior to 
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the finding of guilt by the Honorable Charles G. 
Cowley, defendant made a motion to quash the Infor-
mation on the grounds that the information did not 
allege that a crime had been committed under the 
statute. The motion was denied and defendant was 
convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 
1967) from which defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Second Judicial District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 14, 1967, the defendant, Cathryn E. 
Pfannenstiel, wrote a check payable to the Ogden Tire 
Center in the amount of $11.49 in payment for work 
done on her car, for parts and servicing, by the Ogden 
Tire Center. On July 19, 1967, the check was presented 
to the Sunset Branch of the Clearfield State Bank for 
payment. The bank refused to honor the check because 
defendant did not have sufficient funds in her account 
to cover the amount indicated on the check. (Tr. 10) 
On August 1, 1967, the check was again presented for 
payment and again the bank refused to pay the check 
because of insufficient funds in appellant's account. 
(Tr. 10) 
A complaint was issued against the defendant and 
a preliminary hearing was held November 30, 1967, 
.., .. 
resulting in defendant being bound over to the District 
Court. 011 December 8, 1967, defendant was arraigned 
on an information charging commission of a crime 
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967) by 
writing a check on her account without having suffi-
cient funds ou deposit. Defendant filed a Motion to 
Quash the Information on December 18, 1967, on the 
grounds the defendant's acts did not constitute a crime 
wider Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967). The 
motion was denied on January 26, Hl68. Defendant's 
non-jury trial was held on April 18, 1968, before Honor-
able Charles G. Cowley and appellant was found guilty 
as charged. 
From the denial of the Motion to Quash and d~ -
fendant's subsequent conviction, the defendant appealr. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S ACT IS ONE CLEARLY A 
CRil\IE 'VITHIN THE TERMS OF UTAH 
CODE ANN.~ 76-20-11 (SUPP. 1967), UNDER 
THE PLAIN l\IEANING OF THE STATUTE 
/\.ND THE POLICY BEHIND IT. 
Appellant claims that although she wrote a check 
to pay for serYices performed on her car and that 
although there was not enough money in her checking 
account to pay the check when it was twice presented 
for payment, tlie foct she did not recei\·e any cash in 
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return for the check constitutes no crime under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967.) 1 The state con-
tends that her act is clearly within the prohibition of 
the statute as intended by the Utah Legislature and 
if appellant's argument is accepted, it would effectively 
destroy the legislative intent and purpose for the law. 
It seems clear that the intended scope of the statute 
is to make illegal an act of a person whereby that person 
makes a check and delivers it to another person pur-
porting to pay the other for goods or services and the 
act of making the check impliedly represents that there 
is money in the bank upon which it is drawn, in the 
account of the maker, sufficient to pay the amount of 
the check. In the instant case, the appellant wrote and 
issued a check to pay a bill for services performed upon 
her car. The payment by check represented that she 
had sufficient money in her account at the bank upon 
which it was drawn to pay the amount of the check. 
The fact that her account did not have enough money 
to pay the check makes her act one prohibited by the 
statute. 
If appellant's interpretation of the statute were 
accepted, that the meaning of the phrase "for the pay-
ment of money" as used in the statute means that a 
1 The statutory provision reads in part a.s follows:. . 
Any person who for himself . . . w1llfully, with mtent to 
defraud, makes or draws . . . any check . . . upon anY 
bank for the payment of money, or wages. for labor per-
formed, knowing at the time of such m~kmg . . . . t~at 
the maker . . . has not sufficient funds m, or credit w1!h 
said bank . . . for the paymen~ of s1:1ch checks . . . . . m 
full upon its presentation is pumshable by 1mpnson· 
ment. 
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person must receive cash in exchange for a bogus check, 
then the effectiveness of the statute as a deterrent against 
the making of bogus checks would be eviscerated and 
the policy behind such statute completely ignored. 
This court enunciated the policy behind the state 
statute, prior to its amendment, in State v. Bruce, I 
Utah 2d 136, 262 P .2d 960 ( 1953) , by stating: 
The rapid concourse of modern business and 
commerce requires the reliance upon many and 
often far-flung credit transactions, from city to 
city, across the nation and around the world. Its 
free flow and equilibrium depend upon the use 
of checks, drafts and other instruments evidenc-
ing debt and credit. The passing of worthless 
instruments of credit, although done by a very 
small minority, casts suspicion and doubt upon 
the honest and trusting; such abuses are so dis-
rupting that they cannot well be tolerated. We 
agree with the thought aptly expressed by the 
Supreme Court of Missouri, [State v. Taylor, 
335 Mo. 460, 73 S.W.2d 378} that such conduct 
"disarranges and retards. the business affairs of 
every person and institution through whose hands 
such a check passes to the bank upon which it is 
drawn, and from which it returns by the same 
route to the person to whom it was delivered 
by the drawer. And this nuisance is so common, 
insufferable, and injurious as to cause the state 
to resort to 'the just exercise of its police power' 
* * * to curb and prevent it. 
Our legislature, by the bad check statute above 
quoted, has attempted to eliminate such ann?y-
ances by making them criminal and imposmg 
penalties therefor. This purpose should not be 
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defeated by an interpretation of the statute which 
would perrnit one bent upon fraud to protect 
hirnself . . . (Emphasis added.) 
To adopt appellant's interpretation would be to 
destroy the effectiveness of and the purpose for the 
statute. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING RULE 
OF CONSTRUCTION AND CASE LA\V, THE 
STATUTORY PHRASE "FOR THE PAY-
MENT OF MONEY" CAN ONLY BE DEFINED 
TO MEAN "AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR OR THE 
EQUIVALENT OF MONEY." 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1968) 
states, "~T ords and phrases are to be construed accord-
ing to the context and the approved usage of the lan-
guage ... " Referring to this statutory provision, the 
state contends that the approved usage of the phrase 
"for the payment of money" is that it means using a 
check to pay for goods or services instead of or as a 
substitute for cash. This court, while construing a 
statute in an early case, said: 
As before pointed out, the act is intended to 
accomplish certain specific purposes; therefore 
all of its prm·isionc.;, so far as consistent with the 
rules of construction, must be construed and 
applied in harmony with and in furtherance of 
those purposes. United States Smeltinq, Rcfin-
iny and Mfr!. Co. v. Utah Power and Liuht, 58 
Utah 168, 197 Pac. 902 (1921). 
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In this case, the statute's purpose is to prevent the 
issuance of bogus checks. To interpret the phrase "for 
the payment of money" as meaning using a check as a 
substitute for money is an interpretation in harmony 
with and furthers the purpose of the statute. The state 
contends that under the plain meaning rule of con-
struction, the only meaning that the phrase "for the 
payment of money" could have is that a check is used 
as a substitute for money as this interpretation is the 
only one consistent with the intent in enacting the 
statute and the policy behind it. 
The interpretation of the statutory phrase "for the 
payment of money" as meaning the equivalent or a 
substitute for money finds support in the case law of 
many states. The Kansas court, dealing with a statute1 
similar to Utah's in Foor v. State, 196 Kan. 618, 413 
P.2d 719 (1966), where the appellant argued that the 
statute did not apply to him since he received neither 
money nor an automobile title in return for the check 
be issued said, "the worthless check act does not concern 
itself with whether or not the offender was able to keep 
his ill-gotten gains." They said later in the opinion 
that, "It is the altering, issuing, or delivering the check 
for the payment of money or the equivalent that con-
2 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 20-554 (1963) reads in part as follows: 
Any person who with intent to defraud, shall draw, make 
. . . any check, order or draft on any bank or ~epository 
for the payment of money or its equivalent, knowmg at the 
time of the making, drawing . . . that the maker or drawer 
has no deposit in or credits with such bank . . . or has 
not sufficient funds in, or credit with such .bank . . . ~or 
the payment of such check in full upon its presentation 
shall be punished . . . 
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stitutes the offense . . . The purpose of the act was 
to stop the mischievous practice of overdraf ting and 
"check-kiting" by the issuance of no fund checks 
The offense was complete when the worthless check was 
issued ... as a down payment on the automobile." In 
State v. Avery, Ill Kan. 558, 207 Pac. 838 (1922), the 
Kansas court said, ·'Under the statute of this state, the 
offense does not consist in nonpayment of debt, but 
in resorting to a practice which the legislature regarded 
as demoralizing to business." In People v. Costello, 
26 Cal.Rptr. 155 ( 1964), the court upheld the defend-
ant's conviction for issuing bad checks in payment for 
a refrigerator and checks as payment for gasoline and 
auto repairs. 
For other cases where the defendant was convicte<l 
of issuing bogus checks for payment of goods or services 
under statutes similar to Utah's see State v. Daymus, 
90 Ariz .294, 367 P.2d 647 (1962); Ex Parte Myers, 
119 Kan. 270, 237 Pac. 1026 ( 1925). In neither of 
these cases did the defendant receive money in exchange 
for the issued check. 
Appellant claims that since a check is not money, 
it is inconsistent to interpret the phrase "for the pay-
ment of money" as a substitute or equivalent of money. 
Many courts, however, have stated that a check is, in 
effect, used as an equivalent for the use of cash or money. 
In Du Brzdz v. Bank of Visalia, 4 Cal. App. 201, 87 
Pac. 467 ( 1906) , the court said, "A check on a bank, 
if the drawer have money deposited therein to be checked 
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out, is a demand on such bank for the payment of a 
specific sum of money." In King v. Murphy, 151 N.Y.S. 
467, 480 (1914), the New York Court, in deciding a 
case in tort of fraud, said: 
A check is intended to be representative of 
cash. It is the business of the drawer to know 
the state of his account with his bank and as to 
whether through fraud or carelessness he makes 
the representation that he has cash to meet it, 
as he does by the act of drawing it ... that the 
plaintiff was by reason of the implied represen-
tation that said check was good, was equivalent 
to cash, that defendant would have funds in the 
bank to meet it upon presentation . . . was in-
duced thereby to part with the title and posses-
sion of cattle . . . (Emphasis added.) 
In Tippman Packing Corp v. Rose, 120 N.Y.S.2d 
461 ( 1953) , the court said, "The drawing and delivery 
of a check is, in effect, a representation that there are 
funds in the bank sufficient to meet the check on pre-
sentation and that it will be honored on presentation." 
Citing Heuertmatte v. Morris, 101 N.Y. 63, 4 N.E.l; 
King v. Murphy, supra. See also A. Sam and Sons Pro-
duce v. Campese, 217 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1961); State v. 
Hammelsy, 52 Ore. 156, 96 Pac. 865 (1908); State v. 
Wilson, 230 Ore. 251, 369 P.2d 739 (1962). As the 
above cited cases point out, the common understanding 
of what a check is by many courts is that it is the equiva-
lent to or a substitute for money or cash. As such, the 
phrase "for the payment of money" as used in our 
statute does mean that a check is used as a substitute 
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for money and therefore, as the facts in the present case 
show, when a person makes a check knowing there are 
not sufficient funds in the bank to pay it, and the check 
is given for payment for goods or. services as a substitute 
for money, such act is one prohibited by Utah's statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (Supp. 1967). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the state contends that the act of 
appellant is clearly one prohibited by the Utah statute. 
The phrase "for the payment of money" clearly means 
the giving of a check as a substitute for money or the 
entire intent and policy of the statute would be negated 
and the effect of appellant's interpretation would be 
to disrupt entirely commercial transactions within this 
state making it almost impossible for a check to be used 
in ordinary and daily business transactions. Here, 
defendant, clearly guilty under the statute, is trying 
to subvert the ends of justice by arguing a tenuous 
technicality as a means of securing her freedom. This, 
the State contends, should not be allowed to happen. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
C . .JEFFRY PAOLETTI 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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